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TO BRIBE A PRINCE: CLARIFYING THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
THROUGH COMPARISONS TO THE 
UNITED KINGDOM’S BRIBERY ACT OF 2010 
SAMUEL B. RICHARD* 
Abstract: Bribery in overseas markets is a major concern for U.S. foreign policy. 
In the 1970s, after allegations of corruption abroad, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The FCPA outlines civil and criminal 
sanctions for corporations that seek to bribe “foreign officials.” It also inspired 
responses from other states, including the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act, enact-
ed in 2010. For decades, the federal government enforced the FCPA only sporad-
ically. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, however, increased prosecutions 
under the FCPA by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission led to a corresponding increase in criticism of the statute. Respond-
ing to these critiques in November 2012, the two agencies co-authored a FCPA 
guideline. Viewing this new manual in comparison to prior implementation of the 
FCPA and to the Bribery Act may help determine the most effective tools to 
combat foreign bribery. 
INTRODUCTION 
Residents of the United States invest more capital abroad than any other 
State.1 In 2013 alone, U.S. firms spent over $350 billion overseas.2 This is the 
apex of a decades-long trend that, since 1990, has seen U.S. foreign investment 
grow sevenfold.3 This investment is not always a positive development, as it 
can produce illicit requests by bureaucrats overseas for bribes or kickbacks 
from U.S. corporations.4 Businesses sometimes obtain favorable treatment 
                                                                                                                           
 * Samuel B. Richard is a Managing Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
 1 See Country Comparison: Stock of Direct Foreign Investment Abroad, CENT. INTEL. AGENCY 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2199rank.html (last visited Apr. 
16, 2014). 
 2 JANET K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21118, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: 
TRENDS AND CURRENT ISSUES 1 (2013). 
 3 See id. at 2. 
 4 See Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 232 (1997). 
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from foreign regimes in exchange for agreeing to these illegal appeals.5 This 
occurs most frequently in the developing world, where weak government insti-
tutions create an atmosphere rife with corruption.6 Bribery and corruption neg-
atively affect the conduct of international relations between the United States 
and the world.7 U.S. corporations also suffer costs when they lose contracts to 
foreign companies that commit foreign bribery.8  
In 1977, to combat foreign bribery and improve dealings abroad, the U.S. 
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).9 The FCPA, 
among other civil prohibitions, criminalizes certain payments to “foreign offi-
cials.”10 Not only does the FCPA combat foreign bribery on the part of U.S. 
corporations, but U.S. regulators often utilize the statute against foreign corpo-
rations that might otherwise gain an unfair advantage on their U.S. competi-
tors.11 Conversely, critics of the law argue that it hurts U.S. corporations’ abil-
ity to compete in the global economy.12 
Despite the critiques, for much of the FCPA’s history, the U.S. govern-
ment rarely acted against corporate violations of the statute.13 During the 
George W. Bush Administration, however, the Department of Justice steadily 
increased FCPA enforcement.14 The surge grew throughout the first four and 
one half years of the Obama Administration, when the DOJ averaged over 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 47, 55 (1999). 
 6 See Jonathan P. Doh et al., Coping with Corruption in Foreign Markets, 17 ACAD. MGMT. EX-
EC. 114, 115 (2003). Corruption causes direct and indirect costs to both U.S. firms seeking to conduct 
business in foreign states, and those states themselves. See id. 
 7 See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 60 
(1982). 
 8 See Margaret Ryznar & Samer Korkor, Anti-Bribery Legislation in the United States and United 
Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis of Scope and Sentencing, 76 MO. L. REV. 415, 416 (2010) (“In 
1998 alone, U.S. businesses collectively lost $37 billion worth of contracts abroad due to foreign 
bribery.”). 
 9 See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATION-
AL NORMS 1 (2005). 
 10 See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)), amended by Omnibus Trade & Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, Tit. V, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988), and International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as 
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2012)). 
 11 See Ryznar & Korkor, supra note 8, at 445 (noting how the United States has selected a force-
ful anti-bribery prosecution scheme against foreign corporations). 
 12 See Scott Cohn, US Intensifies Crackdown on Corporate Foreign Bribes, CNBC (Nov. 14, 
2012), http://www.cnbc.com/id/49818589 (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
 13 See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Issues Guidance on Overseas Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2012, at B10. 
14 See Editorial Board, Op-Ed., Bribing Foreign Officials, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bribing-foreign-officials/2012/02/24/gIQAvKUUcR_sto ry.html 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
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twenty-four FCPA actions per year.15 This new emphasis on FCPA implemen-
tation increased the chorus of calls by organizations such as the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce stating that the law is both inadequate and flawed.16 Reacting to 
such criticism in November 2012, the DOJ, in conjunction with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, issued A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act (Resource Guide), a document seeking to clarify some of 
the ambiguous terms and policies of the FCPA.17 
At the time of its enactment, the FCPA uniquely sought to curb bribery of 
“foreign officials.”18 Since the United States established the law, it has inspired 
numerous other states to enact similar provisions.19 Recently, the United King-
dom enacted the Bribery Act 2010 (Bribery Act).20 There are marked differ-
ences between the FCPA and the Bribery Act.21 Comparing the two can help 
determine whether the Resource Guide adequately meets the DOJ’s and SEC’s 
goal of elucidating the FCPA.22 
Part I of this Note provides relevant context to the FCPA, the Resource 
Guide, and the Bribery Act. Part II first discusses how, prior to the issuance of 
the Resource Guide, the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement scheme gave cor-
porations insufficient guidance concerning adherence to the FCPA. Part II con-
tinues by reviewing the Resource Guide’s advice and comparing the relevant 
provisions and interpretations of the Bribery Act with the FCPA. Part III argues 
that the Resource Guide unsatisfactorily clarifies the FCPA and that the Brib-
ery Act may actually offer corporations more of this much needed clarity, 
therefore representing a more adequate statutory scheme for combating foreign 
bribery. This Note concludes by suggesting that Congress should not only con-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2013 Mid-Year FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN PUBLICA-
TIONS (July 8, 2013) at 2, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-
Mid-Year-FCPA-Update.pdf. This stands in contrast to the preceding five years, when the DOJ 
brought an average of approximately eleven actions per year. See id. 
 16 See id. 
 17 See Savage, supra note 13. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 18 See Jon Jordan, The Need for a Comprehensive International Foreign Bribery Compliance 
Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Bribery Environment, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
89, 90 (2012). 
 19 See id. 
 20 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.). 
 21 See R. Zachary Torres-Fowler & Kenneth Anderson, The Bribery Act’s New Approach to Cor-
porate Hospitality, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 39, 41 (2011) (noting that the FCPA exempts certain pay-
ments made by corporations but that the Bribery Act is broader and treats these same payments as 
violations of the law). 
 22 See Lee G. Dunst, et al., Hot Off the Press: Resettling the Global Anti-Corruption Thermostat 
to the UK Bribery Act, 12 BUS. L. INT’L 257, 262 (2011). 
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sider eliminating aspects of the FCPA, but also implementing some of the 
Bribery Act’s provisions into the current statutory scheme. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The FCPA’s Origin & Legislative History 
The contextual framework of the FCPA’s enactment is necessary to un-
derstand the Resource Guide’s potential impact.23 The FCPA is a product of the 
Watergate scandal that plagued the 1970s.24 In the wake of the scandal, evi-
dence arose of illegal contributions from U.S. corporations to the re-election 
campaign of President Richard Nixon.25 This eventually led to an investigation 
by the SEC, which discovered a series of questionable payments made by U.S 
corporations domestically and abroad.26 An SEC report found that foreign 
leaders directly received many of these payments.27 Outrage concerning these 
dubious payments eventually led to congressional action.28 
By the mid-1970s, Congress actively sought to enact legislation that 
could curb illegal payments in foreign markets.29 Leaders in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate believed these payments were a significant for-
eign policy concern.30 These improper payments threatened to irreparably 
damage the reputation of the United States abroad.31 The questionable payment 
scandal also caused significant international outcry.32 Congress faced added 
pressure to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. government did not tolerate 
corruption.33 This led directly to the passage of the FCPA, a comprehensive 
piece of legislation that combated bribery overseas in a brand new way.34 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 59. 
 24 See DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE 
FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 1 (1994). 
 25 See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 17. 
 26 See id. at 17–23. 
 27 See id. at 23. 
 28 See CRUVER, supra note 24, at 4–5. 
 29 See id. at 5. 
 30 See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 60–61. 
 31 See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 934–
35 (2012). 
 32 See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 59. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See DON ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 1–3 (1995); 
Lynne Baum, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 824 (1998). 
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B. The FCPA’s Structure & Key Provisions 
The FCPA uses a multi-faceted approach to tackle foreign bribery.35 The 
law combines accounting provisions with anti-bribery provisions.36 Both sec-
tions amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.37 The accounting provi-
sions deal primarily with record keeping.38 The major anti-bribery provisions 
include: (1) the parties that fall under the FCPA; (2) the definition of a “foreign 
official;” and (3) the kind of payment covered by the statute.39 
1. The Accounting Provisions 
The FCPA’s accounting provisions place a burden on corporations to keep 
adequate records.40 First, corporations must “make and keep books, records, 
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.”41 Secondly, corpora-
tions must maintain a system of internal controls to prevent illegal payments.42 
Both of these duties help enforce the FCPA, by allowing government officials 
to subpoena records and uncover illegal payments more easily.43 The account-
ing provisions apply to illegal payments and can also affect corporations that 
do not keep adequate records of domestic or innocuous transactions.44 The 
provisions apply only to issuers on a United States-based stock exchange.45 
2. The Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have a broader scope than the ac-
counting provisions because they cover not only issuers, but also individuals.46 
Therefore, the anti-bribery obligations do not apply exclusively to U.S. corpo-
rations.47 The anti-bribery provisions provide that the FCPA applies to pay-
ments made to “foreign officials”—individuals who work for a foreign gov-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Kari Lynn Diersen, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 753, 755 (1998). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See John P. Giraudo, Charitable Contributions and the FCPA: Schering-Plough and the In-
creasing Scope of SEC Enforcement, 61 BUS. LAW. 135, 139 (2005). 
 38 See Diersen, supra note 35, at 755–56. 
 39 See id. at 759–61. 
 40 See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Ex-
pansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 507 (2011). 
 41 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 42 See id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
 43 See Cherie O. Taylor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Primer, 17 CURRENTS: INT’L 
TRADE L.J. 3, 4 (2008). 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Baum, supra note 34, at 825. 
 46 See Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 758 (2011). 
 47 See id. 
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ernment or an agency of that government.48 The statute also applies to people 
who act in an official capacity for a foreign government.49 The FCPA is not 
intended, however, to reach payments given to private organizations not affili-
ated with a government.50 Historically, the DOJ and SEC interpret “foreign 
official” broadly.51 
Another aspect of the anti-bribery provisions concern payments that are not 
illegal.52 Simple expenditures (referred to in the FCPA as “facilitating pay-
ments”) made to expedite the delivery of an item, for example, do not fall under 
the purview of the law.53 Because it is not always easy to ascertain what consti-
tutes such a payment, the FCPA makes practical concessions to differences in 
conducting business overseas by allowing less blameworthy behavior, such as 
simple grease payments.54 Grease payments “expedite or . . . secure the perfor-
mance of a routine governmental action.”55 The anti-bribery provisions also cre-
ate affirmative defenses for payments that are legal in the foreign State in ques-
tion and for “reasonable and bona fide expenditures, such as travel . . . .”56 
3. The FCPA’s Enforcement History and Scheme 
The federal government rarely prosecuted corporations under the FCPA 
for several decades after its 1977 enactment.57 DOJ actions typically involved 
instances where corporations themselves voluntarily disclosed FCPA viola-
tions.58 Corporations tended to “self-report” for leniency from prosecution.59 
Fittingly, just as the FCPA was a response to a scandal, it took a major scandal 
to change the perspective on the law.60 
The disaster at Enron in 2001 caused the federal government to re-
evaluate the FCPA’s utility as a method of combating corporate corruption.61 
The Enron managers’ illegal activity shined new light on the vitality of corpo-
rate regulation and demonstrated the increased need for a regulatory tool.62 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Taylor, supra note 43, at 5. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See ZARIN, supra note 34, at 4–11. 
 51 See DEMING, supra note 9, at 11. 
 52 See Ned Sebelius, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 579, 591 (2008). 
 53 See id. 
 54 See DEMING, supra note 19, AT 16; GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 5. 
 55 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 56 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1)–(2). 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 495. 
 59 See Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1447, 1449 (2008). 
 60 See Savage, supra note 13. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. 
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Accordingly, beginning with the Bush Administration, the DOJ and SEC 
sought to more aggressively pursue companies that violated the FCPA.63 
Enforcement and interpretation of the FCPA is dual-pronged.64 The SEC 
handles civil enforcement of the law’s accounting provisions against public 
corporations and the DOJ handles all criminal enforcement.65 Because corpo-
rate bribes are often unreported, the agencies frequently undertake parallel ac-
tions.66 Unlike other statutes, changes in interpretation of the FCPA generally 
do not come from any judicial interpretation of the law.67 Most corporations in 
violation of the FCPA choose to settle with the government and pay fines, ra-
ther than go to trial.68 This avoids the heavy stigmas associated with criminal 
or civil adjudication.69 The lack of trials, however, means minimal case law on 
the FCPA exists.70 Accordingly, interpretation of the statute is placed in the 
hands of the agencies that enforce it—the DOJ and the SEC.71 
To alleviate this emphasis on agency interpretation, the FCPA provides 
administrative relief for corporations seeking advice as to whether their behav-
ior might violate the statute.72 Corporations can request an FCPA Opinion Pro-
cedure Release (Opinion Release).73 An Opinion Release is a non-binding as-
sessment of facts posed by corporate parties.74 The DOJ then interprets the 
issue to determine if an enforcement action should be brought.75 This is a fact 
specific inquiry that is inherently narrow and, by design, incapable of express-
ing a broad interpretation of the FCPA.76 
With increased prosecutions in the last decade, lobby groups have pressed 
the DOJ and SEC for a wider-reaching interpretation of the FCPA.77 These or-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. 
 64 See Timothy W. Schmidt, Note, Sweetening the Deal: Strengthening Transnational Bribery 
Laws Through Standard International Corporate Auditing Guidelines, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1120, 1125 
(2009); see also Westbrook, supra note 40, at 495 & n.14 (explaining how the SEC manages civil 
enforcement of the FCPA against public companies, while the DOJ manages all criminal enforcement 
of the FCPA as well as civil enforcement against private companies). 
 65 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 495. 
 66 See Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of 
Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 396 (2010). 
 67 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 560. 
 68 See Savage, supra note 13. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See Giraudo, supra note 37, at 142. 
 71 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 562. 
 72 See id. at 564. 
 73 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 564. Opinion Releases are much more common from the DOJ 
than the SEC, which has not issued one since 1981. See id. at 563–64. 
 74 See id. at 564. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 See Savage, supra note 13. 
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ganizations felt that clarification of the law could help corporations operate 
lawfully in this new landscape of escalated FCPA enforcement, thus preventing 
future prosecutions.78 In response, the DOJ and SEC promulgated the Resource 
Guide to streamline FCPA interpretation between the two agencies and provide 
clearer rules to corporations.79 This development did not occur in a vacuum, as 
the United States is not the only State in recent years to take new actions 
against foreign bribery.80 
C. The Origin and Basic Structure of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 
For many years after the FCPA’s passage in 1977, the United States re-
mained alone in its decision to criminalize foreign bribery.81 Other states react-
ed slowly to the rise of corporate corruption.82 Eventually, in 1997, numerous 
states signed an international convention concerning foreign bribery.83 Gradu-
ally, the international community continued its response with individual State 
statutes similar to the FCPA.84 
Against this backdrop, the United Kingdom enacted the Bribery Act in 
2010.85 In many respects, the Bribery Act is broader than the FCPA.86 The 
Bribery Act covers both domestic and foreign bribery, but for purposes of 
comparison to the FCPA, the relevant provisions are contained within the stat-
ute’s foreign bribery section.87 
The Bribery Act, however, differs from the FCPA in notable ways.88 Un-
like the FCPA, the Bribery Act contains no accounting provisions requiring 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. 
 79 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 17. 
 80 See Jordan, supra note 18, at 96. 
 81 See Schmidt, supra note 64, at 1125–28. 
 82 See id. at 1126. 
 83 See Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
605, 624 (2007) (detailing the adoption of the Convention on Combating Foreign Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention) by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)). The OECD currently consists of thirty four 
member states, including the United States. Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
 84 See DAVID KENNEDY & DAN DANIELSON, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., BUSTING BRIBERY: SUSTAIN-
ING THE GLOBAL MOMENTUM OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (2011), available at 
http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=slaw_fac_pubs. 
 85 See Jordan, supra note 18, at 96. 
 86 See id. at 39–40. 
 87 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6. 
 88 See Eric Engle, I Get By With a Little Help from My Friends? Understanding the U.K. Anti-
Bribery Statute, By Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 44 
INT’L LAW 1173, 1182–83 (2010) (detailing some of the differences between the FCPA and the Brib-
ery Act). 
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corporations to report illicit payments.89 Additionally, the Bribery Act explicit-
ly applies to any person who bribes a “foreign public official,” rather than just 
to any corporation who makes such a bribe.90 Furthermore, unlike the FCPA, 
the Bribery Act has no defense for “facilitating payments.”91 Finally, the Brib-
ery Act includes an entirely unique defense for corporations that institute ade-
quate procedures to prevent foreign bribery.92 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Interpretation of the FCPA Before the Resource Guide 
The FCPA is nearly 40 years old.93 Nonetheless, because there is a dearth 
of case law, many of its terms remain largely undefined and ambiguous.94 The 
FCPA’s dual-tiered enforcement mechanism has bred confusion and augmented 
concerns over the legislation.95 The SEC rarely issues administrative rulings on 
the FCPA.96 Therefore, prior to the Resource Guide, the greatest source of in-
formation concerning the SEC’s interpretation of the FCPA stemmed from civil 
actions brought against corporations.97 On the other hand, the DOJ issues sev-
eral Opinion Releases per year to provide corporations with guidance in de-
termining whether their behavior might potentially break the law.98 Both of 
these methods of FCPA interpretation, however, contain flaws.99 
1. SEC Case Law 
The SEC enforces the accounting provisions of the FCPA against public 
corporations.100 Over the years, only a few major cases dealing with this aspect 
of the law have gone to trial.101 Most of the decisions in these cases are non-
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. 
 93 See H. Lowell Brown, Avoiding Bribery When Doing Business Overseas: A Primer on the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 20 ME. B.J. 78, 78 (2005). 
 94 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 563; Stacy Williams, Grey Areas of FCPA Compliance, 17 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 14, 15 (2008). 
 95 See GREANIAS & WINDSOR, supra note 7, at 85. 
 96 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 563. 
 97 See Giraudo, supra note 37, at 142. 
 98 See Westbrook, supra note 40, at 565. 
 99 See id. at 564 (“The FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases are generally narrow, limited to the 
specific facts presented, and are not legally binding precedent.”); Giraudo, supra note 37, at 142. 
 100 See Melysa Sperber, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 686 (2002). 
 101 See id. 
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binding, but some representative cases nonetheless offer value towards under-
standing how the SEC interprets the statute.102 
The first time an SEC action advanced to a full trial was a major devel-
opment that provided the judiciary with the opportunity to fully evaluate and 
interpret the FCPA’s accounting provisions.103 In that case, S.E.C. v. World-
Wide Coin Investments (World-Wide), the court attempted to clarify the FCPA’s 
accounting provisions. The court determined that corporations did not need to 
be perfectly accurate when keeping accounting records, but that essentially any 
physical manifestation of corporate information could be considered such a 
record.104 The court read the FCPA as providing far-reaching powers to the 
SEC to audit a corporation’s internal affairs.105 This case compelled Congress 
to amend and clarify the FCPA’s accounting provisions.106 These clarifications, 
however, did not have the intended effect, and corporations still clamored to 
determine how to interpret ambiguous terms such as “in reasonable detail.”107 
More recently, the SEC took actions that strongly articulated the agency’s 
interpretation of the internal controls provision of the FCPA.108 In the 2000 
case of S.E.C. v. International Business Machines Corp. (IBM), the SEC 
viewed a bribe paid by members of IBM’s wholly owned Argentinian subsidi-
ary as prima facie evidence of inadequate internal controls, despite a lack of 
evidence that IBM had actual knowledge of the bribe.109 Additionally, in the 
2004 case of S.E.C. v. Schering-Plough, a corporation again faced scrutiny un-
der the FCPA for the actions of a subsidiary.110 Schering-Plough, a pharmaceu-
tical company with worldwide distribution, had a subsidiary in Poland that 
made charitable contributions to a historical foundation whose president also 
oversaw a regional Polish health authority.111 The SEC saw this connection as 
improper, alleging that Schering-Plough’s internal controls failed to identify 
that these payments were not made for charitable purposes, but to influence the 
director of the health fund.112 
These cases exemplify key issues inherent in utilizing SEC case law to 
counsel corporations on how to adhere to the accounting provisions of the 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See id. 
 103 See Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Expansion of SEC Authority into Inter-
nal Corporate Governance: The Accounting Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (A Twen-
tieth Anniversary Review), 7 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 138 (1998). 
 104 See id. 
 105 See Giraudo, supra note 37, at 143. 
 106 See Lacey & George, supra note 103, at 142. 
 107 See id. at 145. 
 108 See Giraudo, supra note 37, at 144, 147. 
 109 See id. at 144. 
 110 See id. at 147. 
 111 See id. at 147–48. 
 112 See id. 
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FCPA.113 Their utility is limited because so few cases proceed to trial and those 
that do are not broad enough to be adequately helpful.114 Cases like IBM and 
Schering-Plough simply demonstrate extreme instances where the SEC chose 
to enforce the FCPA.115 But because those actions settled, they are not binding 
determinations of how the accounting provisions should be interpreted.116 Even 
a case that proceeded to trial like World-Wide is not entirely useful since it fails 
to interpret the accounting provisions as they currently stand.117 Corporations 
accused of violating the anti-bribery provisions also find little help from prior 
DOJ interpretations of the law.118 
2. DOJ Opinion Releases 
Because SEC case law is limited, DOJ Opinion Releases are the more 
common source of information concerning FCPA enforcement.119 These Opin-
ion Releases are non-binding.120 If, however, an action is brought against a 
corporation that requested an Opinion Release, the corporation can make a re-
buttable presumption that it complied with the FCPA if it followed the DOJ’s 
recommendations.121 To obtain an Opinion Release, a party must request that 
the DOJ rule on a given set of facts.122 The agency reviews the facts and de-
termines whether the party violated the FCPA.123 Because Opinion Releases 
are narrowly tailored to fact-specific situations they do not provide broad in-
terpretations of particular provisions.124 Even so, there are still several recent 
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Opinion Releases that are illustrative of how the DOJ interpreted and applied 
the anti-bribery provisions prior to the publication of the Resource Guide.125 
Opinion Releases have attempted to clarify a number of different issues 
that arise under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.126 One such issue is the 
actions of foreign subsidiaries.127 For instance, in 2010, the DOJ handled a 
situation in which a foreign regulator demanded that a corporation’s foreign 
subsidiary make a grant to other local companies.128 The U.S. corporation 
raised concerns that this required grant could violate the FCPA.129 The DOJ 
decided that there was no violation because the foreign subsidiary took action 
to ensure that the grants were not used for a corrupt purpose.130 The DOJ also 
issued an Opinion Release stating that similar due diligence insulated a corpo-
ration from FCPA liability in the context of a joint venture.131 Similarly, anoth-
er Opinion Release determined that funds used to acquire a foreign corporation 
should not be considered a payment under the law.132 
Opinion Releases have also been used to solicit guidance regarding the 
definition of a “foreign official.”133 One corporation, for example, sought to 
determine whether a consultant with contracts representing a foreign govern-
ment could be considered a “foreign official.”134 The DOJ did not bring an ac-
tion because even though such consultants could be seen as “foreign officials,” 
in the particular case the consultant did not act on behalf of a foreign govern-
ment.135 
In another case, a corporation requested an Opinion Release regarding 
payments made to a member of a royal family.136 The DOJ mentioned that 
membership in a royal family did not automatically mean that person is a “for-
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eign official.”137 The DOJ applied a totality of the circumstances test, and de-
clined to take action because the royal family member did not hold any official 
role within the government.138 Therefore, the family member had no formal 
influence over governmental decisions, and payments made did not fall under 
the FCPA.139 
Opinion Releases have also discussed the type of payments potentially al-
lowed by the FCPA to provide guidance on how various expenses could be 
considered “reasonable and bona fide expenditures” and therefore not illegal 
under the law.140 For instance, one corporation wished to pay expenses for 
twenty journalists from China.141 The DOJ did not bring an enforcement action 
because the expenses were reasonable under the circumstances and in promo-
tion of the firm’s services, and therefore covered under the “bona fide expendi-
ture” exception.142 Similarly, the DOJ held that travel expenses paid to foreign 
officials to learn more about a corporation’s services, and payments made to 
host foreign officials for the same purpose, also fall under the bona fide ex-
penditure exception.143 
These Opinion Releases only serve as DOJ commentary on a specific set 
of facts.144 This, in combination with their rarity, means that Opinion Releases 
cannot reliably serve as a template for FCPA enforcement.145 If a corporation’s 
behavior falls into a grey area not represented by any current Opinion Release, 
it might find itself with no guidance in determining if its behavior violates the 
FCPA.146 In such a case, one of the few ways for that corporation to insulate 
itself from FCPA enforcement is for it to apply for an Opinion Release.147 This 
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is, however, costly and time consuming.148 Not every corporation can take the 
time to utilize this administrative procedure.149 The alternative, therefore, is to 
either forego the business or risk the possibility of an enforcement action.150 
Perhaps equally problematic, Opinion Releases only apply to the DOJ, so a 
corporation could still face liability from another agency, like the SEC, even if 
its prospective behavior gained tacit approval from the DOJ through an Opin-
ion Release.151 
3. Common Issues Surrounding FCPA Compliance 
Many of the FCPA’s provisions face intense scrutiny.152 The lack of judicial 
review in agency decisions contributes to an environment in which the courts 
rarely buffer prosecutorial aggression in pursuing FCPA actions.153 An additional 
criticism, often advanced by interest groups working on behalf of corporations, 
is that the FCPA is too broad.154 This criticism also focuses on the fact that the 
law is largely interpreted solely by the agencies in charge of enforcing it.155 
Though groups such as the Chamber of Commerce fall short of advocating for 
the FCPA’s outright repeal, they contend that the law requires significant 
amendment in order for corporations to reasonably comply.156 Without it, they 
argue, U.S. firms might struggle to compete in foreign markets.157 
Additionally, if the terms of the statute are too vague, they may unconsti-
tutionally provide inadequate notice of the law to defendants.158 Many of the 
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ambiguous terms explicated by the FCPA might therefore fail to provide fair 
notice.159 Where the FCPA has been challenged in court, the cases have some-
times involved challenges based on vagueness.160 Courts are reluctant, howev-
er, to accede to this criticism.161 The DOJ and SEC released the Resource 
Guide with this critical atmosphere in mind.162 
B. The Resource Guide 
The Resource Guide, published in November 2012, is a 120 page outline 
detailing how the DOJ and SEC view the FCPA.163 The Resource Guide is not 
intended to be binding upon any party.164 Rather, it is a source of information 
on the FCPA for corporations and corporate counsel.165 The Resource Guide’s 
purpose is to educate, and thereby prevent FCPA violations.166 The Resource 
Guide attempts to do this by offering a summary of the FCPA’s provisions, as 
well as detailing certain factors and principles that affect FCPA enforcement.167 
It touches on both the accounting and anti-bribery provisions.168  
1. The Resource Guide and the Accounting Provisions 
The Resource Guide approaches the accounting provisions of the FCPA 
by dissecting both the books and records provision and the internal control 
provision of the law.169 Within the context of the books and records provision, 
the Resource Guide notes that the duty to keep records is qualified by the fact 
that the records need only be “in reasonable detail.”170 According to the Re-
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source Guide, the mere fact that the law only requires records to be in reasona-
ble detail does not mean that corporations can mischaracterize the true nature 
of a transaction.171 Referring to a bribe as a commission or royalty fee, for ex-
ample, would still violate the FCPA.172 The Resource Guide also reiterates that 
even in instances where the anti-bribery provisions do not apply, the failure to 
keep adequate records can expose a corporation to liability.173 
The Resource Guide also clarifies that internal controls should conform to 
what satisfies a prudent official.174 This allows corporations flexibility to adapt 
to what will most properly work for their organization.175 The Resource Guide 
advises corporations with a greater risk of engaging in corrupt behavior to en-
act more stringent internal compliance programs.176 
2. The Resource Guide and the Anti-Bribery Provisions 
a. Parties Subject to the Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The Resource Guide also provides information concerning the FCPA’s an-
ti-bribery provisions.177 When deciding what party can be brought under the 
jurisdiction of the statute, the Resource Guide offers tips for determining 
whether a client falls under the law.178 An entity is subject to the anti-bribery 
provisions if it is (1) an “issuer,” (2) a “domestic concern,” or (3) “certain per-
sons and entities . . . acting while in the territory of the United States.”179 
According to the Resource Guide, an issuer is any company listed on a 
U.S. security exchange, or any company that trades in stocks and must file 
with the SEC.180 A domestic concern is either a citizen, national, or resident of 
the United States, or an entity that is organized under U.S. law, or has its pri-
mary source of business in the United States.181 The FCPA also covers foreign 
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nationals or corporations that are acting on behalf of a domestic concern.182 
Finally, the FCPA is also triggered when a foreign national or entity engages in 
the furtherance of a bribe while in the United States.183 
b. The Definition of a Foreign Official 
The Resource Guide also attempts to clarify what constitutes a foreign of-
ficial.184 Looking to the language of the statute, the Resource Guide states that 
payments are illegal when made to anyone either working for a foreign gov-
ernment or on behalf of a foreign government.185 According to the Resource 
Guide, it does not matter if that person is a low level employee or the Minister 
of Defense.186 A “foreign official” must also work in “a department, agency, or 
instrumentality of a foreign government.”187 According to the Resource Guide, 
the FCPA is broad enough to include employees of State-owned and State-
controlled entities, but this is a fact-specific determination.188 Finally, the Re-
source Guide notes that bribes made to officials of certain public international 
organizations, like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are 
also illegal under the FCPA.189 
c. Affirmative Defenses 
The Resource Guide also attempts to explain some of the affirmative de-
fenses to the FCPA.190 When a corporation seeks to claim that the law of a for-
eign country allows a particular payment, the Resource Guide emphasizes that 
this defense only applies if the law explicitly permits such a payment.191 The 
Resource Guide also offers advice on the FCPA’s “bona fide expenditure” de-
fense.192 As part of this defense, travel and lodging expenses are only allowed 
if they either promote the corporation’s services, or are required to perform a 
contract with the foreign government in question.193 As with other provisions, 
the Resource Guide makes it clear that such determinations are fact-specific.194 
The Resource Guide further offers tips to corporations to ensure that a travel 
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expense is a bona fide expenditure, such as making sure that the expenses are 
reasonable, refraining from pre-selecting which foreign officials travel, and not 
advancing funds, among others.195 
The Resource Guide extensively discusses the facilitating payments ex-
ception to the FCPA.196 The exception applies only when the payment is for 
routine governmental action, such as processing visas, and supplying utili-
ties.197 Importantly, the Resource Guide explains that any payment made to 
influence a decision to award business is not a facilitating payment.198 Addi-
tionally, any action within a foreign official’s discretion is not considered a 
facilitating payment.199 The size of a payment does not determine whether it is 
a facilitating payment or a bribe; rather, the inquiry focuses on the purpose of 
the payment.200 Finally, the Resource Guide is clear that simply labeling a 
payment as a facilitating payment does not make it so.201 
3. Considerations Influencing FCPA Enforcement 
Lastly, the Resource Guide outlines the factors that the DOJ utilizes to de-
termine whether to bring an enforcement action under the FCPA.202 The DOJ 
relies on the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, which serves as guidance for all federal 
prosecutors.203 In chapter 9-28.000 of the U.S Attorneys’ Manual, the DOJ out-
lines the principles governing prosecution of business organizations.204 The 
Resource Guide recognizes and outlines these nine factors.205 These factors 
are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the pervasiveness of 
wrongdoing within the corporation; (3) any history of similar misconduct; (4) 
any timely and voluntary disclosure and willingness to cooperate; (5) any pre-
existing compliance program; (6) remedial actions taken; (7) collateral conse-
quences, as well as the impact on the public arising from the prosecution; (8) 
the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation’s 
malfeasance; and (9) the adequacy of non-criminal remedies.206 The SEC con-
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siders similar factors when deciding whether or not to enforce the FCPA.207 
These factors include: (1) the egregiousness of the violation; (2) whether the 
harm created hurts a particular group of victims; (3) whether the harm is ongo-
ing; (4) whether the harm can be investigated efficiently; and (5) whether the 
harm was particularly large.208 
4. Reaction to the Resource Guide 
The Resource Guide’s publication in late 2012 was met with mixed re-
views.209 Some felt the Resource Guide materially articulated the DOJ and 
SEC’s enforcement scheme.210 Others believed the Resource Guide failed to 
break new ground.211 Specifically, in February 2013, the Chamber of Com-
merce, along with thirty other organizations, issued a letter to the DOJ and 
SEC in response to the Resource Guide.212 The groups commented that the 
Resource Guide failed to clearly define terms like foreign official, adequately 
account for corporate compliance programs, and limit corporate liability for 
the actions of foreign subsidiaries.213 
C. Interpretation of the Bribery Act 
Corporations conducting business overseas are no longer subject to only 
the FCPA.214 As the oldest foreign bribery statute, the FCPA has long influ-
enced the application of other laws, such as the United Kingdom’s 2010 Brib-
ery Act.215 For many years in foreign states like the United Kingdom, there 
existed no formal statutes combating foreign bribery.216 Many U.S. corpora-
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tions objected that the FCPA therefore placed them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
foreign competitors.217 This does not mean, however, that the United Kingdom 
did not combat foreign bribery prior to the law’s passage.218 Before the Bribery 
Act, the British system consisted of a collage of legislation and the common 
law.219 This system bred confusion and created numerous loopholes for corpo-
rations to exploit.220 The U.K. Parliament passed the Bribery Act in response to 
this unwieldy system and to comply with international norms.221  
The Bribery Act is much broader than the FCPA in a variety of ways.222 
The Bribery Act does not contain any provisions comparable to the accounting 
provisions in the FCPA, but its anti-bribery provisions are more extensive.223 
For instance, section seven of the Bribery Act criminalizes the failure to pre-
vent bribery, a crime uniquely separate from any liability found in the 
FCPA.224 The Bribery Act’s potential jurisdiction is also more substantial than 
that of the FCPA because it extends to any entity doing business in the United 
Kingdom, no matter where that entity is incorporated.225 In contrast, the FCPA 
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only applies to foreign corporations that either issue on a stock exchange or 
can be considered a domestic concern for having their principal place of busi-
ness in the United States.226  
In addition, the Bribery Act, without defining what an “associated person” 
is, holds corporations strictly liable for preventing such persons from commit-
ting bribery.227 This creates potential criminal liability for corporations not only 
for the actions of officers and employees, but for those of shareholders as 
well.228 The Bribery Act includes a defense to these charges not found in the 
FCPA.229 An entity is not liable for failing to prevent bribery if it “had in place 
adequate procedures designed to prevent persons associated with [the corpora-
tion] from undertaking such conduct.”230 Some have since called for a similar 
provision in the FCPA’s statutory scheme.231 
Another major difference between the FCPA and the Bribery Act is that 
the Bribery Act lacks a defense for facilitating payments.232 This exposes cor-
porations doing business in the United Kingdom to greater potential liability.233 
It could also create conflicts with the accounting provisions of the FCPA.234 A 
corporation needing to document that it made a facilitating payment might be 
in compliance with the FCPA, but in violation of the Bribery Act.235 Further-
more, the Bribery Act does not share the FCPA’s bona fide expenditures de-
fense.236 This means that simple expenses for travel could be considered prima 
facie violations of the Bribery Act.237 Recent guidance from the U.K. govern-
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dom.”). Section 7’s jurisdictional scope could be even greater than the FCPA’s. See id. 
 226 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 17, at 11. 
 227 See Engle, supra note 88, at 1184. 
 228 See id. 
 229 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2); Jordan, supra note 222, at 28. 
 230 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2). 
 231 See id. 
 232 See id. (lacking any exception to bribe payments); see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIB-
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388–89 (2011). 
234 See id. at 389. 
 235 See id. 
 236 See Torres-Fowler & Anderson, supra note 21, at 40–41. 
 237 See id. at 41. 
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ment, however, indicates that a bona fide expenditure defense may be implicit-
ly read into the Bribery Act.238 
III. ANALYSIS 
The DOJ and SEC hoped the Resource Guide would clarify the major 
provisions of the FCPA.239 Even if non-binding, the Resource Guide should, at 
least in theory, help corporations comply with the law.240 There is evidence, 
however, that the Resource Guide has done little to achieve its intended 
goal.241 In fact, it has likely done no more than reiterate the DOJ’s and SEC’s 
interpretation of the statute.242 Rather than simply regurgitating old policy, the 
DOJ and SEC should have made a greater effort to give corporations a clear 
path to follow.243 In many ways, the Bribery Act offers this clarity more effec-
tively than the FCPA.244 Therefore, one way to better serve the congressional 
goals which prompted enactment of the FCPA—to provide corporations with 
the clarity they desperately seek while maintaining a statutory scheme broad 
enough to combat foreign bribery in a forceful manner—may be to amend the 
law to conform more closely with the Bribery Act.245 A thorough examination 
                                                                                                                           
 238 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE GUIDANCE, supra note 232, ¶¶ 26–32. Because section 6 of the 
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 239 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 17, at Prologue. 
 240 See id.; see also COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE 1 
(2012), http://www.cov.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Advisory_FCPA_Resource_Guide.pdf (“[T]he 
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and instead confirms and consolidates the agencies’ previous interpretations of the FCPA’s scope and 
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 242 See id. 
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of the law too vague. See United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 189 (S.D. N.Y. 2004). 
 244 See James D. Painter, The New U.K. Bribery Act—What U.S. Lawyers Need to Know, 82 PA. 
B.A. Q. 172, 172 (2011). 
 245 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012) (lacking an adequate procedures defense), with 
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 6-7 (containing an adequate procedures defense). 
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of the Resource Guide is nonetheless necessary to determine where it ade-
quately provides clarity and where it does not.246 
A. The Adequacy of the Resource Guide 
The Resource Guide is an attempt by the DOJ and SEC to educate corpo-
rations on the FCPA.247 It fails, however, to adequately provide clarification for 
the FCPA’s terms.248 The Resource Guide does not augment the understanding 
of the FCPA beyond what actions against corporations and Opinion Releases 
already provide and therefore does not offer a sufficient solution to the vague-
ness inherent in the FCPA.249 This is especially true because the Resource 
Guide rejects a discreet, formulaic approach in favor of a more holistic ap-
proach.250 Considerable unpredictability concerning FCPA enforcement re-
mains because the Resource Guide does little to alter the public’s perception of 
both the accounting and anti-bribery provisions.251  
1. Adequacy of the Resource Guide’s Approach to the Accounting 
Provisions 
The Resource Guide offers little added clarification regarding the ac-
counting provisions of the FCPA.252 For instance, in describing the books and 
records provision, the Resource Guide, much like World-Wide, simply mimics 
the FCPA itself—stating that this provision requires corporations to provide 
records that are in reasonable detail.253 The only guidance the Resource Guide 
provides is flatly stating that “reasonable detail” is what a prudent officer 
would do.254 Consequently, this clause remains arcane to corporate officers.255 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 149, at 123 (posing the question of whether the Resource 
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Without further detailing what may or may not be prudent, the Resource Guide 
does not provide a workable standard.256 Without such a standard, corporations 
are still left in limbo with respect to what might constitute a violation of the 
books and records provision.257 It would provide greater clarity if the Resource 
Guide offered a clear threshold for when records are “in reasonable detail.”258 
This would allow corporations to more easily assess whether their behavior is 
in conformance with the FCPA.259 
The Resource Guide also does not offer enough guidance to corporations 
on the internal controls provision.260 The only potentially helpful advice the 
Resource Guide offers is that there is no specific set of controls that the SEC 
expects to see when examining a corporation’s internal controls.261 This, how-
ever, only serves to create confusion.262 A corporation might believe it is con-
forming to the prudent controls of its type of industry, only to discover it has 
not conformed to SEC expectations.263 Again, the FCPA would be better 
served by clearer standards that corporations could easily follow.264 
Furthermore, the Resource Guide does nothing to solve the flaws inherent 
in the accounting provisions themselves.265 Requiring corporations to maintain 
adequate records and implement internal controls to prevent foreign bribery 
places a heavy burden on any corporation wishing to do business overseas.266 
This is even more true because not only does the FCPA essentially demand that 
                                                                                                                           
 255 See Mike Koehler, The Unique FCPA Compliance Challenges of Doing Business in China, 25 
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corporations admit to committing bribery overseas in their books, but corpora-
tions may be subject to the accounting provisions even if they have not com-
mitted bribery at all.267 This potentially punishes corporations twice for any 
bribe they might offer to a foreign official.268 This runs counter to the stated 
purpose of the FCPA because it often creates cross-conflicts, as a corporation 
trying to remain in accordance with the accounting provisions can still violate 
the anti-bribery provisions.269 
This is especially true when considering how the DOJ and SEC, accord-
ing to the Resource Guide, could hold a corporation liable for the actions of a 
subsidiary under principles of agency law.270 In such a case, the Resource 
Guide suggests that a corporation will want to demonstrate to the SEC that it 
had adequate internal controls that should have prevented the subsidiary’s vio-
lation.271 Under the principles the SEC uses to decide when to bring civil ac-
tions, this may allow the corporation to avoid sanctions.272 Admitting that the 
parent corporation had enough control over the subsidiary to try to control it 
internally, however, might open up the corporation to criminal liability.273 
2. Adequacy of the Resource Guide’s Approach to the Anti-Bribery 
Provisions 
The Resource Guide also does not offer adequate guidance on how to 
comply with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.274 As with the accounting 
provisions, the Resource Guide offers little analysis on the anti-bribery provi-
sions beyond that which the Opinion Releases have already provided.275 For 
example, with respect to the definition of a foreign official, the Resource 
Guide offers only the cryptic notion that it may be difficult in states not orga-
                                                                                                                           
 267 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 17, at 39; Witten, Parker & Holtmeier, supra note 175, at 6 
(outlining how the SEC can pursue FCPA actions even when the elements of the anti-bribery provi-
sions are not present). 
 268 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012); Witten, Parker & Holtmeier, supra note 175, at 6. 
 269 See Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting Relat-
ed Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent Decree Settlements, 
18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 303, 312 (1998) (describing how the accounting provisions cover all assets 
of a corporation, not just those used for corrupt foreign payments). 
 270 See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 17, at 27. 
 271 See id. at 55. 
 272 See id. 
 273 See id. at 27. According to the Resource Guide, “[i]f an agency relationship exists, a subsidi-
ary’s actions and knowledge are imputed to its parent.” Id. 
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nized like the United States to determine whether an individual actually works 
for a department of that State’s government.276 This does nothing other than 
leave corporations with the difficult task of investigating every connection a 
person that they are dealing with abroad may have to a foreign government.277 
The Resource Guide does no better with regard to the affirmative defens-
es of the FCPA.278 First, it offers no comfort when it suggests that the local law 
defense only applies when the foreign government explicitly allows bribes.279 
Most states that have de facto lawful bribery environments still have enacted 
laws that make bribery illegal de jure.280 Therefore, this FCPA defense is es-
sentially useless in most cases.281 Furthermore, when discussing the bona fide 
expenditure defense, the Resource Guide essentially admits that there is no real 
guidance that can be offered to corporations.282 The Resource Guide states that 
the analysis of whether a payment constituted a bona fide expenditure is fact 
specific.283 This places the burden on corporations to take a totality of the cir-
cumstances test to determine if that payment is too personal to be considered a 
bona fide expenditure.284 This vagueness makes it hard to actually utilize the 
bona fide expenditure defense.285  
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This is not to say that the Resource Guide offers no useful clarifications of 
the FCPA’s terms.286 The Resource Guide satisfactorily describes what is consid-
ered a “facilitating payment” by offering specific examples.287 Further, it pro-
vides beneficial advice to corporations, such as describing how the size of a fa-
cilitating payment is irrelevant when determining whether it should be exempt 
from the FCPA.288 Therefore, corporations can clearly understand that when they 
offer payments to foreign officials to obtain innocuous, every-day items such as 
utilities, they may be able to avoid criminal liability under the FCPA.289 
One of the most helpful aspects of the Resource Guide is its summary of 
the principles that both the DOJ and the SEC use to decide when to enforce the 
FCPA.290 This section of the Resource Guide offers some key assistance for 
corporations hoping to avoid FCPA enforcement actions.291 It details how cor-
porations may forestall criminal or civil liability if they avoid massive harm, 
put in place adequate compliance programs, or quickly show remorse for their 
actions.292 Outlining the factors considered by the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual, 
however, does not solve all of the issues concerning the FCPA because these 
factors are non-binding and only serve to guide federal prosecutors.293 The de-
cision to bring an FCPA enforcement action is still ultimately within the discre-
tion of a particular U.S. Attorney’s office.294 The same can be said for civil 
proceedings under the SEC.295 If the FCPA’s underlying issues are not solved, 
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any guidance corporations take away from the Resource Guide or the U.S. At-
torneys’ Manual will not resolve the difficulties inherent in compliance.296 
B. Solutions to the Issues Surrounding the FCPA 
To correct the issues associated with the FCPA, reformers must first iden-
tify what is more important—narrowing the law’s scope or providing corpora-
tions with guidance on the law’s vague terms.297 Making the law clearer and 
more efficient would increase corporate compliance with the FCPA.298 This 
would eliminate the issue of vagueness that is one of the real roots of the prob-
lem concerning FCPA compliance.299 Clarifying the FCPA through amend-
ments would address these issues, even if in some ways this remedial measure 
would broaden the scope of the statute.300  
A major flaw of the FCPA is the dual-pronged nature of its enforce-
ment.301 Corporations are forced to comply with the requirements of two dif-
ferent agencies, each with its own goals for FCPA enforcement.302 Although 
the Resource Guide may serve as a way to bind the two agencies’ interpretation 
of the FCPA together, this is not enough.303 The fact that parallel proceedings 
are constantly hanging over corporations means that they will almost always 
prefer to pay sanctions or criminal fines rather than taking an action to trial.304 
This prevents the development of any significant jurisprudence regarding the 
language of the FCPA.305 Thus, the only major source of information concern-
ing the FCPA comes from the federal agencies tasked with enforcing the law 
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2014] Clarifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 447 
and the inadequacies of their interpretation of the statute are rampant.306 If 
Congress eliminated the pressure of enforcement actions from both the DOJ 
and SEC, the FCPA might be better equipped to evolve over time and clarify 
its vague terms through the process.307 
Another more practical solution, however, would be to amend the FCPA 
to provide more clarity to corporations.308 This could be done in a few ways.309 
First, terms such as in reasonable detail could be amended further.310 There is 
some precedent for this, as Congress already amended the accounting provi-
sions.311 By explaining what it means to be a prudent officer, Congress could 
provide enough clarity to ensure that corporations do not struggle to abide by 
the accounting provisions of the FCPA.312 
Congress also needs to add more explicit clarification to the FCPA’s defi-
nition of a foreign official.313 Currently, the FCPA simply states that a foreign 
official is someone who works for, or works in an official capacity for, a for-
eign government.314 The lack of clear boundaries surrounding this term means 
that the DOJ can essentially unilaterally define when an individual is and is not 
a foreign official.315 If more clarification existed about what official capacity 
meant, corporations would have a better sense of which individuals fall under 
the FCPA.316 This would allow them to make smarter decisions, and therefore 
avoid breaking the law.317 
Furthermore, Congress should consider amending the various affirmative 
defenses in the FCPA.318 Though it is important to offer defenses to criminal 
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laws, these defenses are too vague, because they offer little practical guidance 
to corporations trying to utilize them to comply with the FCPA.319 The bona 
fide expenditures defense is particularly difficult to ascertain.320 The Resource 
Guide draws the conclusion that the fact-specific analysis turns on whether the 
expense is too personal.321 But corporations can justify many personal expens-
es as having a legitimate business purpose.322 If Disney wished to send officials 
from China to Disney World in an attempt to convince them to open an 
amusement park in Beijing, for instance, would this constitute a bona fide ex-
penditure?323 According to the Resource Guide, it is difficult to say.324 
The Resource Guide offers some factors to guide corporations trying to 
determine the adequacy of a bona fide expenditure defense in advance of pros-
ecution, but the DOJ can still consider the totality of the circumstances and 
unilaterally decide whether the defense succeeds because a payment is a busi-
ness expense, or fails because the payment is intended to entice and influence 
an official.325 This grey area is difficult to maneuver.326 It would be much more 
efficient for the FCPA to eliminate this exception, thus broadening the FCPA’s 
jurisdiction while providing more clarity to the law.327 This would be con-
sistent with the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act, which offers no bona fide ex-
penditure defense at all.328 
Finally, the Bribery Act should be used as an example of a foreign bribery 
statute that, though broad, has clearer and more concise terms that provide 
more clarity than the current terms of the FCPA.329 Congress should consider 
matching the Bribery Act, and the consensus of the international community, 
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by eliminating the facilitating payment exception to the FCPA.330 Once again, 
the exception hurts corporations more than it helps by making the statute more 
ambiguous and therefore more difficult to follow.331 After the Resource Guide, 
however, the need to eliminate this exception might not be as great.332 The Re-
source Guide does an adequate job of explaining what should and should not 
constitute a facilitating payment.333 Even so, amending the FCPA to eliminate 
the exception should be favored because even with it, U.S. corporations are 
still subject to liability under foreign laws like the Bribery Act when they make 
facilitating payments.334 Therefore, Congress should not shy away from elimi-
nating the facilitating payment defense because corporations would be better 
served by knowing that any payment to a foreign official might be considered 
a bribe.335 
Revising the FCPA could also help alleviate criticism that the law is too 
anti-business.336 Congress could emulate the Bribery Act, and amend the FCPA 
to add an adequate procedures defense.337 Currently, the FCPA incorporates an 
idea similar to an adequate procedures defense by requiring corporations to 
maintain internal controls in the accounting provisions.338 Instead of making 
this something corporations need to do, however, it might be more logical to 
provide it as a means for corporations to avoid FCPA liability.339 This would 
allow the law to be broader, because corporations could avoid criminal or civil 
sanctions by demonstrating that they had adequate procedures in place to pre-
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vent foreign bribery from taking place.340 This defense could help corporations 
concerned that they are being held responsible for their foreign subsidiaries 
because it would provide an easy to meet standard for a defense.341 
CONCLUSION 
 Each year, corporations spend billions of dollars in markets outside the 
United States. Now that the DOJ and the SEC are increasingly enforcing the 
FCPA, these transactions have the potential to expose U.S. and foreign corpo-
rations to massive civil and criminal fines. Congress had valid intentions when 
it enacted the FCPA in 1977. Nonetheless, the FCPA falls short in solving the 
problem of foreign bribery. The FCPA does not provide enough clarity to cor-
porations and corporate council. The Resource Guide’s attempt at clarity does 
not do enough. Accordingly, the United States should look to its closest ally 
and adopt some of the provisions of the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act. 
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